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COMMENTS
RES IPSA LOQUITUR: APPLICATION AND EFFECT
MURRAY B. GUTERSON
HE DOCT-INE of res ipsa loquitur has played a significant role in
eighteen cases' appealed to the Washington Supreme Court since
1938.2 Examination of these decisions will reveal that the doctrine of
1 Keller v. Seattle, 200 Wash. 573, 94 P. 2d 184 (1939) ; Clark v. Bremerton, I
Wn. 2d 689, 97 P. 2d 112 (1939) ; Anderson v. Harrison, 4 Wn. 2d 265 103 P. 2d 320(1940); Bremer v. Shoultes, 7 Wn. 2d 604, 110 P. 2d 641 (1941); Hardman v.
Younkers, 15 Wn. 2d 483, 131 P. 2d 177 (1942) ; Case v. Peterson, 17 Wn. 2d 523, 136
P. 2d 192 (1943) ; Mahlun v. Seattle School District, 21 Wn. 2d 89, 149 P. 2d 918
(1944); Wellons v. Wiley, 24 Wn. 2d 543, 166 P. 2d 852 (1946); D'Amico v. Con-
guista, 24 Wn. 2d 674, 167 P. 2d 157 (1946) ; Pacific Coast R.R. Co. v. Amer. Mail
Line, 25 Wn. 2d 809, 172 P. 2d 226 (1946) ; Gardner v. Seymour, 27 Wn. 2d 802, 180
P. 2d 564 (1947) ; Morner v. Union Pac. R. Co., 31 Wn. 2d 282, 196 P. 2d 744 (1948) ;
Carbery v. Fidelity Savings and Loan Assoc., 32 Wn. 2d 391, 201 P. 2d 726 (1949) ;
Nopson v. Seattle, 33 Wn. 2d 772, 207 P. 2d 674 (1949) ; Covey v.'Western Tank
Lines, 36 Wn. 2d 381, 218 P. 2d 322 (1950) ; Shay v. Parkhurst, 38 Wn. 2d 341, 229
P. 2d 510 (1951); Emerick v. Mayr, 139 Wash. Dec. 20, 234 P. 2d 1079 (1951);
Wyderas v. Dykstra, 139 Wash. Dec. 699, 238 P. 2d 1198 (1951).
2 In 1938, a comment on this doctrine appeared in 13 WASH. L. REV. 215, by Mr.
Max Kaminoff.
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res ipsa is applied as circumstantial evidence at two stages of a negli-
gence action, that its application is made in accordance with three
court-made requisites as to the nature of the proof, and that it will be
applied only in the event that the plaintiff in the trial court achieves the
level of proof that is required for its application. It is the author's
purpose to develop the subject within these limits, suggesting, perhaps,
a guide to insure consistency in future applications.
WHEN DOES A TRIAL COURT APPLY RES IPSA LOQUITUR?
According to a majority of American courts-in which this jurisdic-
tion definitely falls, res ipsa loquitur is but a form of circumstantial
evidence.' Hence its initial effect can be only a limited one-it permits
the plaintiff to escape a nonsuit' Even where the defendant does
nothing, a jury question is presented; a plaintiff cannot on the strength
of res ipsa alone have a directed verdict. The defendant, on the other
hand, may so overcome by his evidence inferences arising out of res
ipsa, that a verdict may be directed in his favor. If the issue of negli-
gence is still in doubt when the defendant rests, res ipsa steps in again
with the undefinable appeal to the jury of an instruction such as the
following:
"You are instructed that when a thing which caused an injury to
another is shown to be under the management and control of a person
charged with negligence in the operation of such thing or the failure
to keep it in reasonably safe condition, and if it is shown that an acci-
dent happened which in the ordinary course of things does not happen,
if those in charge of its management and control exercise reasonable
care, then the happening of said accident affords reasonable evidence
in absence of explanation by the person charged with negligence, that
the accident arose from want of reasonable care on the part of such
person. '
The court, in quoting the instruction, went on to point out that
although the burden of explanation devolves upon the defendant, in
the final analysis, the plaintiff's evidence must preponderate in order
for him to succeed.6 "In other words, the procedural effect of a res ipsa
3 PROSSER, TORTS § 44 ". . . some twenty-three jurisdictions clearly adopt this view,
while half a dozen others tend toward it."
4 This nonsuit would appear to be an inevitable consequence of plaintiff's failure to
prove negligence in the ordinary manner.
5 From D'Amico v. Conguista, supra note 1, at 684, 167 P. 2d at 162.
6 "If then, after considering such explanations of the whole case, and of all the
issues as to negligence, injury, and damages, the evidence still preponderates in favor
of the plaintiff, then plaintiff is entitled to recover; otherwise not." D'Amico v. Con-
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case is a matter of the strength of the inference to be drawn, which will
vary with the circumstances of the case."' The burden of proof does
not shift and even the burden of going forward does not change, for, of
necessity, plaintiff must go first and prove what happened.
THE CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO ITS APPLICATION
If this is the effect of the application of res ipsa on the trial level,
what ought the conditions precedent to application of the doctrine be?
In order for an injured party to derive the benefits of res ipsa loquitur,
his case must comply with the following requirements, carried over
somewhat indiscriminately from the earlier decisions:8 (1) it must
be an accident of a type that would not ordinarily occur without fault;
(2) exclusive control of the instrumentality inflicting the injury must
be in the defendant or his servants; 9 and (3) the defendant must have
"superior means of information"'" concerning the circumstances sur-
rounding the accident. The third requirement-that the defendant be
equipped with superior means of information-invites inquiry.
There is a minority group of states where the doctrine's effect is to
permit more than a mere permissible inference of negligence to be
guista, 24 Wn. 2d 674, 684, 167 P. 2d 157, 162 (1946). Sole contra authority claiming
a shift in the burden of proof was found in dicta in Keller v. Seattle, 200 Wash. 573,
94 P. 2d 184 (1939). Actually the trial court had so instructed and on the appeal, the
Supreme Court remained silent on this point.
7 PROSSER § 44 (1941).
8 As evidenced in Washington by a definition like the following: "When a thing
which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the
accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen, if those who have
the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of
explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from a want of care." Poth v.
Dexter Horton Estate, 140 Wash. 272, 275, 248 Pac. 374, 375 (1926); Brothers v.
Grays Harbor Bldg. Co., 152 Wash. 19, 276 Pac. 896 (1929) ; Highland v. Wilsonian
Inv. Co., 171 Wash. 34, 17 P. 2d 631 (1932) ; Anderson v. Harrison, 4 Wn. 2d 265,
103 P. 2d 320 (1940); Mahlum v. Seattle School District No. 1, 21 Wn. 2d 89, 149
P. 2d 918 (1944) ; Pacific Coast R.R. Co. v. American Mail Line, 25 Wn. 2d 809, 172
P. 2d 226 (1946).
0 "The reason for the prerequisite of exclusive control of the offending instrumen-
tality is that the purpose of the rule is to require the defendant to produce evidence
explanatory of the physical cause of an injury which cannot be explained by the plaintiff.
If the defendant does not have exclusive control of the instrumentality producing the
injury, he cannot offer a complete explanation and it would work an injustice upon
him to presume negligence on his part and thus in practice demand of him an explana-
tion when the facts indicate such is beyond his ability." Morner v. Union Pacific R.
Co., 31 Wn. 2d 282, 296, 196 P. 2d 744, 751 (1948).
10 "If the circumstances do not suggest or indicate superior knowledge or oppor-
tunity for explanation on the part of the party charged or if the plaintiff has equal or
superior means of information, the doctrine cannot be invoked." Morner v. Union
Pacific R. Co., 31 Wn. 2d 282, 286, 196 P. 2d 744, 749 (1948). See also Gardner v.
Seymour, 27 Wn. 2d 802, 180 P. 2d 564 (1947) ; Mahlum v. Seattle School District
No. 1, 21 Wn. 2d 89, 149 P. 2d 918 (1944) ; Bremer v. Shoultes, 7 Wn. 2d 604, 110
P. 2d 641 (1941).
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drawn from the evidence. In those states where the minority rule
obtains, application of res ipsa creates a presumption which will give
the plaintiff a directed verdict in the event the defendant offers no
evidence to rebut it. In such a jurisdiction, it is within the bounds of
reason to call for superior means of information on the part of defend-
ant before subjecting him to the adverse directed verdict should he
fail to rebut the presumption. But as has been stated, the doctrine does
not produce such severe consequences in Washington. An examination
of the cases has revealed the expected: the third element-superior
means of information-has been lifted by the Washington court from
the minority jurisdiction.11 Actually, the factor of plaintiff's compara-
tive ignorance should be of no consequence if those courts which res
ipsa is given only the procedural effect of an inference from circum-
stantial evidence. 2 The practice of adopting the requirements of the
minority and the operative effect of the majority restricts the effect of
the doctrine to a level necessarily inferior to that of either."
THE STATE OF THE PROOF AT WHICH THE DOCTRINE Is APPLIED
The remaining portion of the discussion will deal with what may be
termed the "state of the proof" at which the doctrine will be applied.
Generally stated, res ipsa loquitur will be applied in the manner
already considered when, in the opinion of the trial court, the proof of
the case of the injured party has reached a certain level-when he has
shown what happened. Failure to achieve this level, or success in con-
tinuing beyond it, are both fatal to the application of res ipsa.
Recent cases do not reveal this distinction with any clarity, however.
In D'Amico v. Conguista,4 the court said, "Nor does the allegation
11 Noting Morner v. Union Pac. R. Co., supra, note 10, the Washington Court
called for "superior means of information." In so doing the court quoted from 45 C. J.
1205. On examining the jurisdictions cited for their textual material both C. J. and
65 C. J. S. 1001 list Illinois, New York, Rhode Island, and Virginia as their sources.
The most recent cases in these jurisdictions are: Curley v. Ruppert, 272 App. Div.
441, 71 N.Y.S. 2d 578 (1947) ; Edmonds v. Heil, 333 Ill. App. 497, 77 N.E. 2d 863
(1948) ; Dufresne v. Theroux, 69 R.I. 280, 32 A. 2d 609 (1943) ; Seven Up Bottling Co.
v. Gretes, 183 Va. 738, 27 S.E. 2d 925 (1943). Prosser lists these jurisdictions as sub-
scribing to the minority procedural approach for many years. PROSSER, TORTS, 304
n. 45, citing Kay v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 163 N.Y. 447, 57 N.E. 752 (1900);
N.Y.C. & St. L. R. v. Blumenthal, 160 Ill. 40, 43 N.E. 809 (1895) ; Kearner v. Charles
S. Tanner Co., 31 R.I. 203, 76 Ati. 833 (1910) ; Riggsby v. Tutton, 143 Va. 903, 129
S.E. 493 (1925).
12 PROSSER § 43.
13 Even more dissatisfying is the fact that no decision in our jurisdiction has turned
on the absence of this element of superior means of information although our court
has repeatedly included it within the prerequisites to application of res ipsa.
14 Where plaintiff's husband was killed by a wheel which became disengaged from
defendant's truck, rolled upon the curb, and struck him.
RES IPSA LOQUITUR
and proof of specific negligence deprive a plaintiff of the benefit of the
rule." Of a similar nature is this language: "This court has adopted
the rule that, even though a plaintiff should base his action upon the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, he may plead and prove specific acts of
negligence on the part of the defendant and rely upon the presump-
tions of negligence, and also, upon his proof of specific acts of negli-
gence in support of his right to recover." 6
Then, in July of 1951, the following and seemingly contradictory
approach was taken in Emerick v. Mayr: "Here the appellant alleged
specific acts of negligence on the part of respondents and introduced
evidence in support thereof. The question of respondent's negligence
and the direct cause of the accident were squarely presented to the
trier of fact, and there was no occasion to resort to the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur." 1" Does the foregoing truly point up an area of con-
tradiction in the court's determination of whether or not to apply res
ipsa loquitur, or, once again, would a use of more precise and definite
language reconcile two apparently irreconcilable approaches?
Logically, no distinction should be drawn between the plaintiff who
only shows what happened and the plaintiff who shows what happened
and also attempts to make evident how or why the negligent act oc-
curred-by pleading or introducing proof of specific acts of negligence.
If the court will aid the plaintiff who can show only the former, the
plaintiff who goes further in the presentation of his case certainly
should not be penalized, and such has been the normal Washington
result." In light of this can there be any valid explanation for the
25 Also found in earlier Washington cases: Walters v. Seattle, Renton, and South-
ern R. Co., 48 Wash. 233, 93 Pac. 419 (1908); Kluska v. Yeomans, 54 Wash. 465,
103 Pac. 819 (1909).
16 Case v. Peterson, 17 Wn. 2d 523, 529, 136 P. 2d 192, 195 (1943) ; D'Amico v.
Conguista, 24 Wn. 2d 674, 167 P. 2d 157 (1946) ; Highland v. Wilsonian Inv. Co., 171
Wash. 34, 17 P. 2d 631 (1932). In the Peterson case, for example, plaintiff introduced
testimony that a fence was overly charged with electricity and also that no notice
was given-certain specific allegations of sub-standard conduct; still, the court per-
mitted the instruction (a wire is not severely charged with electricity close to a road
and without notice of such unless someone was negligent).
17Emerick v. Mayr, 139 Wash. Dec. 20, 22, 234 P. 2d 1079, 1080 (1951). Defend-
ants were attempting to load an enormous log into plaintiff's truck to be hauled away.
Log slipped causing injury. Plaintiff alleged (1) failure to use proper loading methods
and (2) general negligence in permitting log to break away. The court declined to
give the desired res ipsa instruction.
18 Mahlum v. Seattle District, supra, note 10, Highland v. Inv. Co., supra, note 15,
Case v. Peterson, supra, note 15. As stated "the allegation and proof of specific acts of
negligence do not deprive the plaintiff of the benefit of the doctrine." A rationale for
this very sound approach was stated in the Peterson case: "The reason for the rule we
have adopted by these cases is that a plaintiff may not desire to rely wholly upon the
presumption of negligence, but may wish to strengthen his case by proof of specific
acts of negligence so that, if the trier of fact should believe the presumption had been
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language in Emerick v. Mayr?"9 This writer so believes and also feels
that such explanation may assist in explaining future holdings on the
subject. The point is this: In the Emerick case, the plaintiff did more
than introduce proof of the defendant's negligence; the plaintiff actu-
ally proved negligence. As the Supreme Court said in its opinion,0 "We
are of the opinion that it was established by a clear preponderance of
the evidence that [defendants] were negligent ... .""
The language depicting a seemingly irreconcilable conflict can be
attributed to broad statements such as, "The allegation and proof of
specific acts of negligence do not deprive the plaintiff of the benefit of
the doctrine."2 1 Precisely, the preceding statement would declare that
the pleading and introduction of proof does not deprive the plaintiff
of the benefit of the doctrine, a declaration that is certainly true and
yet quite obviously distinct from granting the application of res ipsa
loquitur to the plaintiff who has successfully proven the specific act or
acts of negligence-as was done in the Emerick case.2 On but slight
reflection it can be seen that this distinction is valid. Where the evi-
dence clearly stamps the precise act or acts negligent, there is no
longer room for inference, presumption, or conjecture; 2 1 to use res
ipsa in instructing the jury would clearly work an injustice on the
defendant whose testimony has been directed to softening the blow of
the specific negligent acts leveled against him. When the plaintiff knows
just how an injury occurred, the recovery must be predicated upon a
overcome by evidence submitted by the defendant, the plaintiff, if he has a cause of
action, would, nevertheless, be entitled to recover upon his proof of the specific acts
of negligence." 17 Wn. 2d 523, 529, 136 P. 2d 192, 195 (1943).
19 Emerick v. Mayr (log-slipping case), supra, note 17.
20 The Emerick v. Mayr opinion, supra, note 17, at 24, 234 P. 2d at 1082, reversed
a trial court decision for the defendant and thus awarded the plaintiff the decision with-
out resort to res ipsa loquitur.
21 Id. at 24, 136 P. 2d at 1084. A portrayal of a specific type of negligence, the
same as is normally necessary to be proven in any negligence case.
22 Mahlum v. Seattle School District, supra, note 1, at 98, 149 P. 2d at 923.
23 This point is quite vividly spotlighted by Mr. Kaminoff's language: "The doc-
trine, in effect, says that under certain circumstances an inference of negligence is
valid. Why should that validity be affected by the plaintiff's attempt to prove specific
acts of negligence, keeping in mind the fact that this applies only when the plaintiff's
attempts to prove the specific acts are unsuccessful? Once the actual cause of the injury
is established beyond controversy of course, whether by the plaintiff or by the defend-
ant, no presumptions will be involved." 13 WASH. L. REv. 215, at 223. See also Barnes
v. J. C. Penney Co., 190 Wash. 633, 70 P. 2d 311 (1937).
24 Carbery v. Fidelity Savings and Loan Assoc., 32 Wn. 2d 391, 201 P. 2d 726
(1949) ; also see Wellons v. Wiley, 24 Wn. 2d 543, 166 P. 2d 852 (1946) and Ander-
son v. Harrison, 4 Wn. 2d 265, 103 P. 2d 320 (1940). The language of the Anderson
case was this: "This case is not an instance of an unsuccessful attempt to prove the
precise cause, but, on the contrary, is an instance of a reliance upon definite causative
facts, excluding all inferences of a cause or thing which, unexplained, does not happen,
according to common experience, without fault on the part of the carrier. In such
cases, the doctrine does not apply." 4 Wn. 2d at 273, 103 P. 2d at 324.
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finding of facts constituting the negligence; it cannot then rest upon
the doctrine. But the mere introduction in proof of evidence or an
allegation that was not borne out in the trial is certainly no sound basis
for denying the benefit of res ipsa loquitur to a plaintiff.
IDENTIFICATION OF THE OFFENDING INSTRUMENTALITY
As has been stated, the determination to invoke res ipsa loquitur
depends upon: (1) establishing an unusual accident, (2) exclusive
control of the instrumentality in the defendant, (3) the dubious re-
quirement of superior knowledge, and (4) plaintiff's failure to prove
the specific negligent act.
However, disturbing language in other Washington decisions must
be reconciled to the rule. For example, in 1946, the cdurt said: "It has
been held that one charged under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is
not to be put to his proof unless-there is some showing of cause ...
The cause of the accident-the offending instrumentality---must be
identified before one charged is put to an answer."25 (Italics supplied.)
In Gardner v. Seymour,2" the Washington court declared, "The [plain-
tiff] cannot substitute the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur for proof of
proximate cause in the case ... the proof of proximate cause cannot
be left to conjecture or speculation." And, as recently as 1948, in
Morner v. Pacific Coast R.R. Co., the court stated the following:
"Since . . . the injurious occurrence here involved resulted or could
have resulted from the operation of one or more agencies or instru-
mentalities or from several independent agencies or instrumentalities
operating concurrently, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not
applicable."2
In the preceding topic, proof of the definite cause of injury removed
all need for inference and became the death blow, on a logical basis, to
any aid from res ipsa. And now the Pacific Coast, Gardner, and
Morner cases seem to confuse this reasoning by adding that without
proving direct cause, a plaintiff cannot possibly benefit by the doctrine.
25 Pacific Coast R. R. Co. v. American Mail Line, 25 Wn. 2d 809, 819, 172 P. 2d
226, 232 (1946) ; McClellan v. Schwartz, 97 Wash. 417, 166 Pac. 783 (1917).
26 Gardner v. Seymour, 27 Wn. 2d 802, 812, 180 P. 2d 564, 571 (1947) (man
fatally injured in fall down an elevator shaft).
27 Morner v. Union Pac. R. Co., 31 Wn. 2d 282, 296, 196 P. 2d 744, 752 (1948)
(where plaintiff's car and another truck collided while both were driving in the same
direction, parallel to a railroad track, on which a train was also moving and emitting an
enveloping vapor). It should further be noted that the absence of the second element of
exclusive control 'on part of defendant in this case- would also prevent application of
the doctrine.
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Nevertheless, it is submitted that the cases can be harmonized on the
following basis: In every case, even where plaintiff seeks the support of
res ipsa, "the plaintiff must still show what happened."2 He must
always go that far. As has been said, if he goes further and shows how
the accident or injury occurred, the doctrine will not be applied in his
favor-simply because he no longer needs it. But in these three cases,
the truth of the matter is that the plaintiff in each failed even to prove
what happened, and hence there is no basis whatsoever for the infer-
ence that the injury was caused by defendant's fault.2" In each case,
the plaintiff failed to perform the primary obligation of every com-
plainant-that of establishing his adversary as the party directly
responsible for his injury. This requirement is quite different from
what at first blush the court's language seemed to demand, that is,
proof of exactly how the accident occurred-the very thing which in
fact will necessitate denying the application of res ipsa loquitur. The
plaintiff must maintain this burden in every case; on certain occa-
sions, where the facts permit, his inability to go further will be com-
pensated for in part, at least, by res ipsa.
CONCLUSION
In general, it can be stated that the Washington cases in res ipsa
loquitur during the past fourteen years have arrived at satisfactory
28 
HARPER, TORTS § 77 (1933).
29 In Pacific Coast R. R. Co. v. Amer. Mail Line, 25 Wn. 2d 809, 172 P. 2d 226
(1946), there was no showing that the hitting of the scow by the vessel forced the
scow to strike the dock and do the damage. In Gardner v. Seymour, 27 Wn. 2d 802,
180 P. 2d 564 (1947), the plaintiff's evidence was so slight that the party responsible
for plaintiff's fall could just as well have been plaintiff himself. In Morner v. Union
Pac. R. R. Co., 31 Wn. 2d 282, 196 P. 2d 744 (1948), there was considerable doubt as
to what agency caused the collision inflicting plaintiff's injuries-the driver of the car
in which plaintiff was riding (who was attempting to pass a truck) or the train
emitting the steam. Res ipsa loquitur will not salvage such incomplete cases for
plaintiffs!
Another quite valuable point is made in the Morner decision when the court says:
"However, assuming for the purposes of this decision that under the theory of
[plaintiffs'] complaints and the evidence adduced by them in support thereof, the doc-
trine was applicable to the extent of taking the case beyond a non-suit [simply that
the steam emission was the proven sole proximate cause] and thereby casting upon
[the defendant] the burden of producing explanatory evidence as required by the rule,
the question then arises whether, at the conclusion of all the evidence, it was necessary
or proper to submit the doctrine to the jury under instructions by the court?" 31 Wn.
2d at 297, 196 P. 2d at 752. In other words, this statement presents an analysis of that
type of case where by doing what every plaintiff must always do-prove what hap-
pened-the proof will, of necessity, have established how the injury was caused. By
establishing the steam emission as the proximate cause, the only remaining question
is whether in quantity or situs of emission that act was negligent. The how is included
in the what; in those circumstances the doctrine is not to be invoked; not because
plaintiff failed to qualify for its aid, but because necessarily he has gone beyond the
point of inference.
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results. The nonsuit is avoided and the instruction given when, on
logical analysis, such a course is sound. But, as has been emphasized
in this comment, the loose terminology the Washington court has used
to explain its results has tended to reduce the precedent value of the
individual case. Future opinions might be designed to provide analysis
as sound as result, and language effectively distinguishing the bases of
quite dissimilar results.
